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INTRODUCTION 
Before the case was decided, it was clear that Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo could have hammered a nail in much of class action law.1 Tyson 
swung for the fences at the Supreme Court, arguing that the use of statistical 
evidence in a class action trial that the company had lost violated both the 
Rules Enabling Act and due process. Had the Court adopted Tyson’s 
argument, it would have greatly restricted the use of the class action device 
whenever the members of a plaintiff class had any relevant non-commonality. 
As co-amici and I argued in a brief filed in support of the respondents, Tyson’s 
approach involved a radical view of evidence that would have destabilized 
numerous areas of the law.2 While the company struck out at the Court, it 
remains to be seen whether Tyson is game-over for those seeking to narrow 
Rule 23’s reach when statistical evidence is involved. But as I shall argue 
below, the statistical character of the evidence in Tyson should not be regarded 
as especially important, and in any event, Tyson is important for broader 
reasons than its modest embrace of such evidence in class litigation. 
In this Article I review the Tyson opinion and provide a relatively deep 
dive into the appropriate roles that both the evidence in the case and evidence 
law played. It is my hope that this analysis will be helpful in thinking about 
how the class action game should be played in an important set of future class 
certification cases, particularly those involving Rule 23(b)(3). Commentary 
on Tyson has rightly pointed to the role of the substantive law—here, the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Iowa’s Wage Payment 
Collection Law (IWPCL).3 The substantive law certainly matters, of course. 
But I argue that the key to the Supreme Court’s proper resolution in Tyson 
involves more than just that, since the Court made important connections 
between the substantive law, the questions the plaintiffs’ evidence sought to 
 
1 I borrow this metaphor from Justice Kagan’s dissent in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013): “To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a Court 
bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.” 
2 See Brief for Civil Procedure Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6-11, 
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (No. 14-1146) [hereinafter Professors’ Brief]. 
3 See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s Non-“Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1625, 1649 (2017) (arguing the use of statistical evidence is “baked into” the FLSA remedial 
regime); Andrew J. Trask, Litigation Matters: The Curious Case of Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, in 
CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2015–2016, at 279, 292-308 (Ilya Shapiro ed., 2016). 
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answer, and evidence law itself. Evidence law and the character of the evidence 
in the case were not merely incidental to Tyson—they were integral to it. 
Part I provides some basics about the Tyson litigation. Part II develops a 
view of the kind of evidence that the plaintiff class used in Tyson, which I 
call counterfactual evidence. Counterfactual evidence is evidence that can 
answer the question to which it is addressed only under inferential 
assumptions that themselves cannot be answered with direct evidence. In 
Tyson, both the representative testimony of named plaintiffs and the time 
study evidence had this character. Part III shows that a proper view of class 
certification in Tyson is aided by understanding this counterfactual character 
of the evidence—rather than anything about the statistical or even representative 
aspects of the time-study evidence. Part III also shows the comfortable fit of the 
counterfactual character of the evidence with substantive labor law at issue in 
Tyson, and it considers the important role of federal evidence law in Tyson. 
Finally, Part IV draws together these ideas into what I call the “Triangle of 
Law” for considering class certification. The vertices of the Triangle represent 
the substantive law at issue in a case, Rule 23’s provisions, and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. Located in the center of the Triangle is the evidence in the 
particular litigation in question. This visual model is helpful because the three 
sources of law represented by the Triangle’s vertices are bilaterally 
interconnected, and the evidence in any case will be connected to all three 
sources of law. These various links between evidence and sources of law help us 
visualize the practical connections between the various aspects of class action 
litigation, connections which the Tyson case and Supreme Court opinion 
illuminate. Thus the Triangle of Law, with evidence at its center, provides a 
contemporary reflection of what Steve Burbank and Sean Farhang describe as 
the 1966 Advisory Committee’s focus on “turn[ing] federal jurisprudence from 
abstract inquiries to functional analysis that considers the practical as well as 
the formal legal effects of litigation.”4 Part IV concludes with a reflection on 
how greater emphasis on the practicalities of litigation would affect the 
consideration of two issues that were posed, but not taken up, in Tyson. 
I. THE TYSON LITIGATION 
The Tyson plaintiffs were employees at the Tyson Foods Storm Lake, Iowa hog 
processing plant.5 They did dangerous, dirty, and difficult work on an assembly line 
that transformed live hogs into commercial meat products.6 Employees on a shift 
were paid from the time that the first hog reached their station until the time that 
 
4 Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against 
Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (2017). 
5 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1042 (2016). 
6 Id. 
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the last hog left it.7 This system was referred to as the “gang time” system.8 
Employees brought suit claiming that the time spent walking to and from their 
stations and donning and doffing personal protective equipment before and after 
their shifts and lunch breaks constituted work activities under the FLSA.9 
The FLSA mandates that covered employees who work more than forty 
hours in a week must be paid time-and-a-half for hours worked in excess of 
forty.10 The plaintiffs in Tyson brought suit under the FLSA and sought to 
represent other employees at the plant.11 Under the FLSA’s representative action 
section, § 216(b), they have a right to do so “for and in behalf of . . . themselves 
and other employees similarly situated,” provided that the other employees 
provide consent in writing.12 The resulting “opt-in” action, sometimes known 
as a collective action, ultimately had 444 plaintiffs.13 
It appears that the Rule 23 class action device is not available for claims 
brought directly under the FLSA.14 But Rule 23 was involved in the Tyson 
litigation anyway. The IWPCL requires timely payment of wages owed.15 
Overtime wages owed under the FLSA are also owed under the IWPCL, so 
the plaintiffs asserted derivative IWPCL claims against Tyson. Because the 
IWPCL claims arise under state law, § 216(b)’s opt-in requirement does not 
apply. Plaintiffs bringing such “hybrid” FLSA/state-law claims in federal 
court may use Rule 23(b)(3) to try to maintain a class action as long as there 
 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2012). 
11 136 S. Ct. at 1042. 
12 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
13 Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043. 
14 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this question, though it has stated that “Rule 
23 actions are fundamentally different from collective actions under the FLSA.” Genesis Healthcare 
Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013) (citing Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 
165, 177-78 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also, e.g., LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 
286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing the FLSA collective action and the Rule 23 action as “mutually 
exclusive and irreconcilable”). Curiously, no case discussing the issue even mentions the supersession 
clause of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (“All laws in conflict with such rules 
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”), much less explains how a 
1966 amendment to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure could be preempted by statutory text enacted 
in 1938. The best explanation would seem to be found in the advisory committee’s note to the 1966 
amendments to Rule 23, which states flatly as to subdivision (b)(3) that “[t]he present provisions of 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) are not intended to be affected by Rule 23, as amended.” While this note predates 
the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act requiring explanatory notes, see § 2073(d), there are 
numerous reasons why “courts should give effect to Advisory Committee Notes unless the Notes 
conflict with the text of the Rule.” See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1169 (2002). 
15 IOWA CODE § 91A.3 (2015) (“An employer shall pay all wages due its employees . . . 
at least in monthly, semimonthly, or biweekly installments on regular paydays which are at 
consistent intervals from each other . . . .”). 
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is federal subject matter jurisdiction. This is practically important to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys because the opt-out nature of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action 
may yield a class size—and thus a damage award—that dwarfs those of the 
§ 216(b) opt-in collective action. That is exactly what happened in Tyson, with 
the state-law opt-out class including nearly eight times as many plaintiffs as 
the FLSA opt-in class.16 
Tyson contested the plaintiffs’ motion for certification of both the FLSA 
opt-in and the IWPCL opt-out class actions. Rejecting Tyson’s arguments, 
the district court certified overlapping classes consisting of all workers at the 
plant who were paid on the gang time system over a class period extending 
from February 7, 2005 to the “present”—presumably July 3, 2008, the date 
of the certification order.17 The district court’s certification order came in a 
sixty-four-page memorandum opinion that gave extensive consideration to 
whether Rule 23’s preconditions for certification were met.18 In this opinion, 
Judge Bennett acknowledged that “Tyson points to numerous factual 
differences regarding the clothing and equipment employees wear, even 
among those paid on a gang time basis[.]”19 But, he continued, 
the court is not convinced these factual differences defeat commonality 
among all employees paid on a gang time basis. All employees paid on a gang 
time basis wear some sort of PPE, and all store their PPE in the same lockers, 
at the same plant, and all are required to don and doff their PPE. In addition, 
most all use some kind of knife, and also a scabbard or steel.20 
Further, Judge Bennett concluded that any factual differences were small 
enough that they didn’t violate Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.21 It does 
not appear that Tyson filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f).22 
To win on the merits, the employees would have to prove both (1) that the 
donning, doffing, and walking activities constituted work; and (2) that Tyson 
had failed to pay overtime wages as a consequence of its failure to pay for the 
time these activities took. In addition, they would have to provide sufficient 
evidence to prove (3) the number of minutes of overtime for which Tyson had 
failed to pay its employees, such that the amount of unpaid overtime wages 
could be fairly calculated.23 As to element (1), plaintiffs offered their own 
 
16 The state-law class contained 3344 plaintiffs; the FLSA class contained 444 plaintiffs. 136 S. 
Ct. at 1043. 
17 Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 870, 909 (N.D. Iowa 2008). 
18 See id. at 901-09 (analyzing the IWCPL class under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3)). 
19 Id. at 904. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See Trask, supra note 3, at 298 n.78. 
23 Bouaphakeo, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 909. 
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representative testimony as well as the testimony of Tyson managers.24 To establish 
elements (2) and (3) they would need to measure the number of minutes each 
employee should have been paid, but was not, each day he or she worked. 
The FLSA requires employers to keep records of employee work time.25 
Because Tyson did not pay employees for the donning, doffing, and walking 
activities at issue,26 the company had not kept such records. Thus, the plaintiff 
class needed a way to estimate the number of minutes these activities took 
them each day. At trial, they provided two types of evidence to this effect: 
The first was representative testimony by opt-in plaintiffs and Tyson 
managers.27 The second consisted of testimony and demonstrative evidence 
related to a time study conducted by Dr. Kenneth Mericle. Dr. Mericle made 
hundreds of video recordings of various Tyson employees conducting the 
donning and doffing activities in question28 and “used an industrial 
engineering technique to estimate the amount of walking time based on the 
distances that people walked and standard walking speeds.”29 He then 
calculated the average time, as exhibited in these recordings, that employees 
spent walking and donning and doffing personal protective equipment. Dr. 
Mericle testified as to these averages, which were 18 minutes for employees 
working in the cut and re-trim departments and 21.25 minutes for those 
working in the kill department.30 Various exhibits related to Dr. Mericle’s 
time study were entered into evidence and available to the jury for 
review.31 Plaintiffs also called a statistical expert, Dr. Liesl Fox, who 
explained that she had taken Dr. Mericle’s averages and used them in tandem 
with millions of Tyson’s daily records of paid employee work time to 
estimate each employee’s number of unpaid overtime hours that resulted 
from Tyson’s failure to pay for donning, doffing, and walking time.32 
 
24 See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 1560-1658, Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 
5:07-cv-04009, 2012 WL 4471119 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 26, 2012) (testimony of Jim Lemkuhl). 
25 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2012) (requiring covered employers to “make, keep, and preserve . . . records of 
the persons employed by him and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment”). 
26 The exception involved “K code” time. Before 2007, employees in certain departments 
received credit for four minutes of K code time for donning and doffing activities that Tyson 
did regard as work under the FLSA. Bouaphakeo, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 879. Thereafter, 
following IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), Tyson began providing employees variable 
amounts of K code time, between four and seven minutes. Id. 
27 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
28 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1043 (2016). 
29 Transcript of Record, supra note 24, at 84. 
30 Id. at 1182. 
31 For example, tables from Dr. Mericle’s expert report were received into evidence. Id. at 849. 
Various video clips were offered and received as well. See, e.g., id. at 985, 989, 992, 1003, 1008, 1119. 
32 Id. at 1265-80. It has been noted that Dr. Fox’s estimation method involved some 
nonlinearities, meaning that a given change in the number of unpaid minutes of daily work 
would not necessarily translate into a proportionate increase in the total damages owed. Brief 
of Civil Procedure Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 20, Tyson Foods, 136 
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Tyson aggressively cross-examined the testifying plaintiffs and their 
experts. It asked penetrating questions meant to discredit the merits of both 
Dr. Mericle’s time study and of Dr. Fox’s use of its results to calculate 
damages. It did not, however, object to the admission of any of the 
aforementioned evidence. Tyson also did not introduce its own expert to 
testify about a competing time study—though the company had hired 
one to do so, had listed him as an expected trial witness,33 and had told 
the district court that the question of which expert’s study was superior 
was a question properly submitted to the jury’s discretion.34 In sum, Tyson 
eschewed opportunities both to attack the admissibility of plaintiffs’ 
evidence on relevance grounds and to offer the jury alternative and more 
compelling evidence. Its trial strategy was centered on convincing the 
jury that the plaintiffs’ evidence was flawed and should be disregarded. 
Judge Jarvey (who had by now taken the case over from Judge Bennett) 
gave the jury a verdict form asking specific questions. The jury found that 
the donning, doffing, and walking activities at issue in the case 
constituted work, which was a question of fact under the FLSA.35 The 
jury found that damages amounted to $2.9 million, less than half the $6.7 
million that plaintiffs had requested based on Dr. Fox’s testimony.36 
Though Tyson did not object at trial to the evidence that it placed in issue 
at the Supreme Court, the company did avail itself of several procedural 
mechanisms. First, it moved to decertify the class before trial, following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.37 It also moved 
for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) and renewed this motion 
after the trial under Rule 50(b).38 It then appealed Judge Jarvey’s denial of 
the renewed motion to the Eighth Circuit.39 After losing there, Tyson 
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, maintaining that the use of Dr. 
Mericle’s time study evidence in a class action violated the Rules Enabling 
Act and due process, and that the Supreme Court should order the lower 
 
S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146). For example, reducing the estimated number of minutes of unpaid 
work time by 10% would not necessarily correspond to a reduction in total damages of 10%. Id. 
33 Def.’s Memorandum Supporting Exclusion of Any Reference to Dr. Paul Adams, or 
His Ops., at Trial at 2-3, Bouaphakeo, 2012 WL 4471119 (No. 5:07-cv-04009). 
34 Def.’s Resistance to Plantiffs’ Omnibus Motion in Limine at 11, Bouaphakeo, 2012 
WL 4471119 (No. 5:07-cv-04009). 
35 Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1044. By contrast, the jury also found that the company-provided 
lunchtime was a bona fide meal break and thus not work under the FLSA. Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See Def.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Decertification of Rule 23 
Class, Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-JAJ, 2011 WL 3793962 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 2011). 
38 See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1044; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
39 Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1044-45. 
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courts to decertify the class.40 The company’s cert petition did not raise the 
argument of legal insufficiency of the evidence, and it did not suggest that 
any evidence was admitted in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
In its merits brief at the Supreme Court, Tyson made a beguiling 
argument. Tyson stated that the average times drawn from Dr. Mericle’s time 
study “masked important differences that should have precluded 
certification.”41 By allowing the plaintiffs to use these averages, the district 
court “impermissibly lessened plaintiffs’ burden of proof and undermined 
Tyson’s ability to defend itself.”42 Allowing this evidence to establish the 
number of minutes of unpaid work time for all plaintiffs in the Rule 23 class 
therefore violated the Rules Enabling Act’s admonition that rules promulgated 
under the Act must not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” 
since the burden of proof is substantive.43 Further, it violated Tyson’s due 
process rights as to both the Rule 23 class and the FLSA collective action. 
Tyson provided a pithy summary of the basis for these contentions: 
No court would allow an individual employee to meet his burden of proving 
that he performed work for which he was not properly compensated by 
submitting evidence of the amount of time worked by other employees who 
did different activities requiring a different amount of time to perform. Yet 
that is exactly what happened here. Plaintiffs obtained an aggregate classwide 
damages award by applying Mericle’s average times to all class members 
without producing evidence that all class members actually worked overtime 
for which they were not compensated.44 
On its face this argument seems reasonable enough. If the unpaid work 
time varied across class members, why should a plaintiff class be allowed 
to use averaged evidence? Shouldn’t every plaintiff seeking damages in a 
lawsuit have to provide evidence about her own alleged loss? If the burden 
of proof—understood to be an aspect of substantive law—is thereby 
lowered, then the Rules Enabling Act is violated. 
But if the Supreme Court had endorsed Tyson’s evidentiary 
principle, it would have unsettled vast areas of law in which courts 
regularly allow one person to use evidence about another person as to 
events that are in some respects different from those involving the first 
person. Gajillions of examples are possible; here I offer three: 
 
40 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146). 
41 Brief of Petitioner at 36, Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012)). 
44 Id. at 36-37 (footnote, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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• Under Mississippi law, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of using national averages of earnings to calculate lost earnings in 
an individual wrongful death action.45 Obviously, that involves 
using data on the earnings of other people involved in other 
activities than those engaged in by the plaintiff. 
• Texas law allows epidemiological studies to be used to establish 
general causation in drug liability cases. A plaintiff may use such 
evidence even if it involves people who took the drug for a 
different period of time, or in different dosages, from the 
plaintiff—the key for admissibility is that those in the study and 
the plaintiff have not taken very different dosages for very 
different periods of time.46 
• Although the Supreme Court in Comcast v. Behrend recently 
ordered the decertification of a class in an antitrust case because 
the plaintiffs’ proffered damages model wasn’t limited to 
measuring the proper damages, it did not do so simply because 
plaintiffs used an econometric model considering information 
about non-class members.47 Nothing in Comcast indicates that 
such information could not be used in a model directed at 
measuring only the damages at issue in the case. 
These examples share the common feature of allowing one person to use 
evidence about other persons engaged in possibly different activities. As this 
Article argues in Parts II and III, it is appropriate to allow such evidence 
when that is the only way to answer a question that is not answerable 
with direct evidence, as is the case in the above examples and in Tyson. 
It is impossible to understand the underpinnings of Tyson, or the correct 
direction for representative—and thus statistical—evidence in class 
certification without understanding the important and salutary role of 
counterfactually relevant evidence. It will aid this argument to first 
discuss the nature of counterfactually relevant evidence itself. 
II. COUNTERFACTUAL QUESTIONS REQUIRE COUNTERFACTUALLY 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
A counterfactual question is a question that can be answered only with 
knowledge of events that would have occurred in some state of the world that 
might not actually have come to pass. For example, any question related to 
but-for causation has a counterfactual component. To know whether a car 
 
45 See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 1277 (Miss. 2000). 
46 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2011) (finding relevant a 
study examining patients taking a drug at twice the dosage and for nine times as long as plaintiff). 
47 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433-34 (2013). 
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accident, rather than some other factor, was the but-for cause of Carla’s sore 
back would require observing Carla in both the state of the world in which 
the car accident actually happened and a state in which it did not. To know 
whether the Vioxx pills Tim ingested were the but-for cause of Tim’s heart 
attack requires knowing whether Tim would have had the heart attack had he 
not taken Vioxx. Despite the fact that a determined skeptic could insist on 
the unanswerability of counterfactual questions, many problems in social 
science, history, and other fields require answering them.48 As the examples 
above illustrate, law is no exception.49 This Part explores the role of 
counterfactually relevant evidence in answering such counterfactual questions. 
A. Counterfactual Evidence 
It is useful to recall that evidence can be separated into two traditional 
categories—direct and circumstantial. For example, if Billy accuses Joe of 
punching him in the face, then Billy’s testimony, “Joe punched me in the 
face at the bar at midnight,” is direct evidence.50 If Employee sues Business, 
accusing Business of not paying wages for three hours of work done on 
January 14, then Employee’s time card showing that Employee clocked in at 
nine and clocked out at noon is direct evidence.51 Similarly, an audio or video 
recording of an event is direct evidence about that event. Circumstantial 
evidence is evidence “based on inference and not on personal knowledge or 
observation.”52 For example, evidence that Joe wasn’t home at midnight, 
 
48 Such counterfactual questions play a pivotal role in contemporary statistical methods 
directed toward evaluating the effects of policy or other changes. The epistemic challenge in this 
area, known as the “fundamental evaluation problem,” is that “it is impossible to observe what would 
happen to the same unit of study in multiple mutually exclusive states of the world.” Jonah B. 
Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access 
to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2296 (2012); see also Jill E. Fisch et al., The Logic and Limits of 
Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 
6-27), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2817090 [https://perma.cc/U2MH-
EZF8] (discussing the role of a market regression model in estimating daily stock returns in 
the counterfactual scenario in which no event related to securities fraud had occurred). 
49 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. Sergio Campos has noted the important role 
counterfactual questions sometimes play with repect to the distribution of injuries across individuals within 
a putative class, arguing that, in at least some important cases, “proving the counterfactual may involve 
evidence that is common to some or all of the members of the class.” Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide 
Injury, BROOK. J. INT’L L. 751, 757 (2012). 
50 Black’s Law Dictionary defines direct evidence as evidence “that is based on personal 
knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” 
Direct evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
51 Assuming the time card is kept in the ordinary course of Business’s business, it will 
be admissible at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(B). 
52 Circumstantial evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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when Billy alleges Joe punched him in the face at the bar, is circumstantial 
evidence that Joe was, or might have been, in the bar at midnight. 
What I call counterfactually relevant evidence is a subcategory of 
circumstantial evidence. Counterfactual evidence tends to establish or 
contradict some fact F only under auxiliary assumptions about the world that 
are not themselves susceptible to complete evaluation via direct evidence. 
Suppose F is the claim that Drug caused Patient to suffer a heart attack. 
Direct evidence as to F would require a way of observing whether Patient 
would have had the heart attack had Patient not ingested Drug. Such 
evidence is obviously impossible to obtain, since we cannot observe the 
state of the world in which Patient did not ingest Drug. Courts often allow 
plaintiffs to introduce experimental and epidemiological evidence concerning 
the effects of products on other persons to establish what has become known 
as general causation.53 But the evidence as to general causation is relevant 
only if Patient is assumed to be similar enough to the populations of persons 
whose reactions to Drug have been systematically studied. There is no way to 
marshal direct evidence that would completely answer the question of 
similarity, so the experimental or epidemiological evidence is an instance of 
counterfactual evidence, with similarity being the necessary assumption. 
For another example, suppose that F is the lost future earnings of 
twenty-year-old Victim, who has been rendered a quadriplegic by admittedly 
reckless Tortfeasor. It is impossible to obtain direct evidence of Victim’s future 
earnings, since Victim’s injury will prevent her from garnering those earnings 
in the first place. The law might allow Victim to establish the magnitude of 
lost future earnings by allowing her to introduce evidence of present-day 
average earnings of older persons with characteristics similar to Victim’s. Such 
evidence tells us something relevant about Victim’s lost future earnings if we 
believe that Victim would have been treated similarly in the future labor 
market to how present-day older persons are treated in today’s labor market. 
There is no way to fully answer this similarity question with direct evidence 
alone, so similarity is the type of necessary auxiliary assumption such that the 
evidence as to lost earnings is counterfactual evidence. 
To be sure, not all circumstantial evidence is counterfactual in 
nature. For example, the circumstantial evidence that Joe wasn’t at home 
is not counterfactual evidence that Joe was in the bar at the alleged time, 
 
53 See Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 549, 551-52 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. & Nat’l Research Council eds., 3d ed. 2011). 
Patient then has the burden of showing that there is no discernible alternative cause of her specific 
heart attack besides the fact that she took Drug. Of course, the defendant may be able to rebut 
this conclusion by showing evidence of alternative causes of this specific heart attack in Patient. 
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because it would be possible to produce direct evidence that Joe was in 
the bar at midnight (e.g., via eyewitness testimony). 
B. Counterfactual Evidence in the Tyson Case 
Tyson featured both non-counterfactual and counterfactual evidence. 
Examples of non-counterfactual evidence included the testimony of 
employees about the nature of the unpaid donning, doffing, and walking 
activities they performed; testimony from both workers and members of plant 
management concerning the number of hours of paid gang time work 
employees typically completed; and testimony from Dr. Fox concerning 
Tyson’s records of work time for which Tyson did pay each worker in the class. 
On the other hand, one example of counterfactual evidence included Dr. 
Mericle’s video recordings of workers’ donning and doffing activities. This 
evidence is counterfactual for two reasons. First, it involved only a sample of 
all possible disputed employee-activity combinations. Second, the video 
recordings were taken after the dates about which there was a legal dispute. 
This latter point illustrates an unappreciated aspect of Tyson: No matter 
what kind of proceeding occurred, no party would have been able to provide 
non-counterfactual evidence concerning the amount of unpaid work that was 
done donning, doffing, and walking. Tyson couldn’t do it because the company 
didn’t keep records. Workers couldn’t do it because they also didn’t keep 
records; because many if not all of them did different jobs in the plant at 
different times; and—completely ignored by both Tyson and the Supreme 
Court—because common sense tells us that the amount of time it takes a 
person to do the same task will not be exactly the same on all days. 
It should go without saying that people move more slowly when they are 
tired, when they are afflicted with the common cold, or when they are 
hungover, than when they are well rested and chipper. So all an employee 
could plausibly testify to at trial is that it typically takes her a certain amount 
of time to don and doff particular types of equipment. Such testimony would 
therefore be counterfactual in nature—just like the video recordings of 
donning and doffing by sampled employees. Accordingly, the video-recording 
evidence of sampled employees suffers no qualitative disadvantage 
relative to testimonial evidence from each individual employee.54 
Another example of counterfactual evidence in Tyson is Dr. Fox’s use 
of average times from Dr. Mericle’s time study. This use was a major 
flashpoint of the controversy before the Supreme Court. As detailed in 
Part I, Tyson argued that it was inappropriate for Dr. Fox to assume that 
 
54 That is not to say that video recording or other time-study evidence is necessarily 
equal in persuasiveness to testimony—just that all are examples of counterfactual evidence. 
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each plaintiff worked the same number of unpaid minutes donning and 
doffing. At oral argument, Tyson argued that not all employees worked in 
the same jobs, so not all of them always used the same equipment.55 
But without records, any information as to how much work time any 
individual employee had done on specific dates could be provided only by 
counterfactual evidence. The operative question for the plaintiffs’ evidence is 
not whether it precisely answered the collection of questions related to each 
individual worker’s daily unpaid work time. Rather, the operative question is 
whether the employees’ actual donning, doffing, and walking times could be 
assumed to be sufficiently similar so that it would be reasonable to use an 
overall measure—such as an average—in place of the unknowable actual 
times.56 In turn, the reasonableness of this auxiliary assumption can be 
determined only by reference to the underlying substantive law. Once it is 
known what facts are of consequence, the practical litigation questions of 
what evidence should be admitted, and what consequences flow from a failure 
to object to admission of evidence, hinge on federal evidence law. 
C. The Logical Relationship Between Counterfactual and Direct Evidence 
Intuition suggests that counterfactual evidence should not always be 
admissible. I have explained that, in the absence of records, the time-study 
evidence in Tyson might be an appropriate substitute for the actual time that 
Tyson’s employees spent on unpaid work. But what if Tyson had kept—and 
offered into evidence—reliable records of the unpaid work time? Then the 
time-study and testimonial evidence the plaintiffs offered would have been 
irrelevant. When direct evidence of a fact is available, counterfactual evidence of 
the same fact will no longer be useful—at least not if the factual evidence is 
credited. 
Suppose that factual statement F is true if counterfactual evidence C is 
credited and auxiliary assumption A holds.57 Further, suppose that F is false if 
direct evidence D is credited.58 It is not problematic for a person to credit both C 
and D. Even though direct evidence D compels belief that F is false, counterfactual 
evidence C does not by itself compel belief that F is true. Only the combination 
of A and C does that. Accordingly, a person who believes both C and D is 
 
55 That said, there was “testimony that employees frequently rotated between positions[.]” 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) 
(No. 14-1146). Thus, employees’ uncompensated work time from donning, doffing, and 
walking activities must have been more similar than the separate job titles would indicate. 
56 As Sergio Campos points out, such a substitution is quite common in individual actions: “[i]n 
individual mass tort actions, for example, plaintiffs often prove injury by analogizing to other cases, in effect 
importing the counterfactual [question] from one case to another.” See Campos, supra note 49, at 788. 
57 Formally, (C & A) → F. 
58 Formally, D → not-F. 
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compelled to believe that F is false59—just as is a person who believes D alone. So 
if the person believes D, then counterfactual evidence C must be logically 
irrelevant. This is the case because the person must believe F is false whether or 
not she credits the counterfactual evidence. In sum, counterfactual evidence that 
conflicts with direct evidence a person credits is logically irrelevant. Therefore, the 
usefulness of counterfactual evidence depends on the broader evidentiary context. 
What should happen if the auxiliary assumption necessary for 
counterfactual evidence to be probative is itself a merits question that would 
have to be resolved in a jury trial? In other words, what if C isn’t probative 
unless A is correct, and what if the correctness of A is a jury question? Such 
a situation involves what has been called the “overlap problem.”60 A full 
treatment of the overlap problem is beyond the scope of this Article. But the 
problem may be resolved by having the judge come to a provisional 
conclusion about the auxiliary assumption and then allowing the jury to 
make its own determination (presumably without having the judge inform 
the jury of the provisional determination). This structure is familiar in class 
action litigation, in which certification and merits questions “[f]requently” 
overlap, with the Supreme Court holding that there is no problem with 
“touching aspects of the merits in order to resolve preliminary matters[.]”61 
Mapped into the terrain of counterfactual evidence, this approach allows 
a judge who believes auxiliary assumption A is reasonable to admit both (1) 
counterfactual evidence C, which, together with auxiliary assumption A, 
would establish the truth of factual statement F; and (2) direct evidence D 
that would, if credited, establish that factual statement F is false. This allows 
the judge to leave it to the jury to decide whether to credit D, preserving the usual 
allocation of duties of judges and juries in the federal trial court system.62 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE TYSON DECISION: THE TRIANGLE OF 
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND THE CHARACTER OF THE EVIDENCE 
It shouldn’t have especially mattered that the time study averages used in 
Tyson constituted statistical evidence, nor even that these averages were 
representative evidence more broadly. Class certification requires a showing 
adequate to meet the tests raised by Rule 23(a) and (b) in light of the 
 
59 Since D is credited, it must be the case that not-F is true. By the contrapositive 
property, we have not-F → not-(C & A), which means that when D is credited at least one 
of C or A must not be. Since C is credited ex hypothesi, A must not be. 
60 See 21A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5053.5 (2d ed. 2005) 
61 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351-52 (2011). 
62 Of course, in handling such issues, the judge should apply Federal Rule of Evidence 
104’s framework for deciding preliminary questions as to admissibility. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
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controlling substantive law that sets liability policy.63 The evidence in the 
record will often play a role in determining whether Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance and superiority requirements are met, especially in light of the 
Supreme Court’s recent treatment of class certification.64 But in light of the 
statutory nature of federal evidence law, and the familiar procedural 
requirements the Rules Enabling Act (REA) imposes for changing both the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of Evidence, the Supreme Court had 
no warrant to create free-floating common law concerning the use of 
statistical evidence to certify a class action under Rule 23.65 To the extent that 
Rule 23 requires the party seeking certification to provide evidence, substantive 
liability policies and federal evidence law working together—rather than federal 
common law interpreting Rule 23—must be the basis for determining the 
adequacy of the evidence. To suggest otherwise would allow the Supreme Court to 
use federal common law to overturn rules of evidence enacted by Congress or 
promulgated through the REA process. Framed that way, Tyson should be seen 
as a case that required the Supreme Court to clarify that evidentiary questions are 
not somehow more severely policed simply because class litigation is involved. 
The Tyson Court recognized precisely this point. It observed that federal 
evidence law and the FLSA and IWPCL together would have allowed 
plaintiffs to use the contested statistical evidence in Tyson in hypothetical 
individual actions.66 Therefore, they could also use this evidence in class 
litigation under Rule 23. In fact, Justice Kennedy’s lucidly written opinion 
noted Tyson’s REA argument was backward: it would violate the REA if a 
court determined an evidentiary question raised by Rule 23 differently from 
how it would have determined that question in individual litigation involving 
the same underlying substantive law.67 This is an instance of what Maria Glover 
has recently referred to as the “symmetry principle.”68 This principle may be 
 
63 See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1027 (2013) for a keen discussion of the appropriate role of substantive law and policy at class certification. 
64 See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350-51 (“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. 
A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the 
Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous 
parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” (emphasis in original)). 
65 It is true that Federal Rule of Evidence 402 allows for “other rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court” to limit the admissibility of relevant evidence. But Rule 23’s sole mention of the word 
“evidence” states only that a district court “may issue orders that . . . determine the course of 
proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in presenting 
evidence or argument[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1). This text provides no basis for the Supreme 
Court to fabricate a general common law rule determining when evidence is inadmissible. 
66 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046-47 (2016). 
67 Id. at 1046 (“To so hold would ignore the Rules Enabling Act’s pellucid instruction that 
use of the class device cannot ‘abridge . . . any substantive right.’” (omission in original) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012))). 
68 Glover, supra note 3, at 1657-62. 
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thought of as jointly embedded in the principle of transsubstantivity announced in 
Rule 169 and in 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)’s prohibition on using Rules to “abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right.”70 If procedure must both be transsubstantive and 
not change substantive rights, then substance must be transprocedural. 
The Tyson Court explained that Dr. Mericle’s time-study evidence would 
have been admissible in a collection of hypothetical individual actions 
brought by Tyson’s workers, so it must also be admissible in class litigation. 
This discussion places the evidentiary focus where it belongs—on the 
relationship between the time-study evidence and the elements of labor law 
that plaintiffs sought to prove using that evidence. As the Court noted, 
Tyson’s litigation choices stuck it with no possible counterargument as to the 
 
69 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in 
the United States district courts . . . .”). Some have argued that the REA’s grant of power to the 
Supreme Court to prescribe “‘general’ rule[s] of practice and procedure” prohibits substance-specific 
Rules. See Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 733, 741 (1988) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). Steve Burbank has challenged this view, 
arguing that this text in the REA was intended only to require geographic uniformity. See Stephen 
B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1934-35 (1989) 
(“Professor Carrington would have us believe that . . . the Rules [must] be not only uniform, but 
also trans-substantive. I know of no support for that proposition . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
70 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). Tyson gave only a cursory development of its REA argument in 
terms of REA doctrine. For example, it did not engage with the line of cases—stretching from 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), to Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965), to Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010)—stating that a Federal Rule 
is valid if it “really regulates procedure[.]” Brief of Petitioner, supra note 41, at 36-40 (failing to 
mention these cases in its section on the REA). The Hanna Court famously suggested that it would 
be well-nigh impossible for a Rule to violate the REA (or, for that matter, the Constitution) given 
the process of law development through which Rules travel. 380 U.S. at 473-74. But if Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion taking this position in Shady Grove appears to read § 2072(b) out of the United 
States Code, Justice Ginsburg was right to point out in dissent that a majority of the Court took the 
opposite view when one counts Justice Stevens’s position in concurrence. 559 U.S. at 442 n.2. Thus 
it appeared in Shady Grove that that there might exist circumstances under which the substantive 
rights component of the REA would have real bite. Tyson was sub rosa asking the Court to make this 
appearance a reality. 
While it has received virtually no attention of which I am aware, the Tyson majority did just 
that, in two simple sentences: 
In a case where representative evidence is relevant in proving a plaintiff’s individual 
claim, that evidence cannot be deemed improper merely because the claim is brought 
on behalf of a class. To so hold would ignore the Rules Enabling Act’s pellucid 
instruction that use of the class device cannot “abridge . . . any substantive right.” 
Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (omission in original). The Tyson Court thus agreed with 
Tyson’s view that the Enabling Act’s “substantive right” language is not a dead letter, but it 
pointed that language right at Tyson, rather than deploying it on Tyson’s behalf. 
It appears that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Sotomayor have switched sides on this issue 
(both were in the Shady Grove plurality), joining Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Breyer (Shady 
Grove dissenters) and Justice Kagan (not yet on the Court in Shady Grove). So there are now six 
votes, not just five as in Shady Grove, in favor of a robust view of the REA’s “substantive right” 
language—and these six votes spoke in unison rather than through the muffled tones of a single concurring 
Justice taking up with four dissenters. This development, if sustained, would be a major one in its own right. 
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admissibility of the representative evidence in the case. By the time the case 
reached the Supreme Court, this evidence could only be viewed as both 
relevant and legally sufficient for a jury verdict that determined damages for the 
members of the class.71 That left no Rule 23 question for the Court to adjudicate. 
The rest of this Part reviews the role of substantive law at class certification. It 
then addresses the role of evidence law, which before Tyson had not played a 
starring role in the Supreme Court’s analysis in recent class certification cases. 
A. Substantive Law and the Counterfactual Character of Evidence 
1. The Statutory Substantive Law in Tyson 
In Tyson, the relevant substantive law setting out liability policy came from both 
federal and state statutory sources. The FLSA provided the substantive law for 
claims based on an opt-in collective action brought under 29 U.S.C. § 216. The 
IWPCL incorporated the substantive rights and obligations created under the 
FLSA, such that proof Tyson violated the FLSA was necessary and sufficient to 
establish that Tyson violated the IWPCL.72 Since Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out 
 
71 The jury was instructed in three relevant ways. First, that “[i]n order for non-testifying 
members of the class to recover, the evidence must establish that they suffered the same harm as a 
result of the same unlawful decision or policy.” Final Instructions to Jury at 5, Bouaphakeo v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009, 2012 WL 4471119 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 26, 2012). Second, that “the 
weight to be accorded the evidence is a function not of its quantity, but of its quality—whether the 
testimony covers similarly situated workers, and is generally consistent.” Id. at 6. Third, that “[t]he 
representative evidence, as a whole, must demonstrate that the class is entitled to recover.” Id. Thus 
an order decertifying the class because of too many dissimilarities might be construable as re-examining 
factual determinations the jury made after trial. Lurking behind the verdict, then, was the possibility 
of a serious constitutional question concerning the scope of the Seventh Amendment’s 
Reexamination Clause. By leaving the class certification order undisturbed for the time being, the 
Court stealthily avoided this question; for more on stealth avoidance, see generally Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Veiled Avoidance (Sept. 26, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
72 That is not to say that certification raises equivalent issues for the federal and derivative 
state claims. Aside from provisions related to the mechanics of demonstrating consent to opt in, this 
part of the FLSA explains only that FLSA collective actions “may be maintained . . . by any one or 
more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). Thus, where Rule 23(a) and (b) are chock full of conditions to be met 
before a Rule 23 class action may be maintained, § 216(b) requires only that those in the opt-in class 
be “similarly situated” to the named plaintiff(s). The Supreme Court has never clarified what 
showing a plaintiff must make to support a collective action under § 216(b). In a barely developed 
argument in its merits brief, Tyson asked the Court to declare that the requirements for certification 
of a collective action under § 216(b) exactly match those necessary to certify a Rule 23 class. Brief of 
Petitioner, supra note 41, at 26-27. The Court declined even to acknowledge this request; instead it 
simply observed that the parties agreed that § 216(b) requires no more than Rule 23, so that its 
approval of the Rule 23 class was sufficient to also bless the § 216(b) collective action. Tyson Foods, 
136 S. Ct. at 1045. The proper threshold for certification under § 216(b) was teed up for the 
Court in a recent cert petition to which the Court responded with a GVR. See FTS USA, 
LLC v. Monroe, 137 S. Ct. 590 (2016); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i-ii, FTS USA, 137 
S. Ct. 590 (No. 16-204). The petition asked the Supreme Court to clarify the requirements for 
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aggregation is apparently not available for claims brought directly under the 
FLSA,73 state law functioned as the ticket into the class action theater. 
The elements necessary to establish liability in the case were simple 
enough. Plaintiffs needed to prove (1) that they did unpaid work, (2) in weeks 
when they worked more than forty hours.74 Since the FLSA requires proof 
of actual damages,75 workers would need to prove (3) the number of unpaid 
hours of work they did. To address element (1), the plaintiffs introduced 
evidence describing several donning, doffing, and walking activities for which 
they were not paid.76 As to these activities, the controversy was whether 
they constituted “work” under the FLSA. The jury did determine that 
these activities were “work”, bringing elements (2) and (3) into play.77 
The FLSA requires employers to keep records of the amount of time 
employees work.78 Through its gang time system, Tyson did keep such records 
for those hours of work for which it did pay workers. Given an acceptable way 
to measure the typical amount of unpaid work time, the plaintiffs would be 
home free: they had access to Tyson’s weekly records through discovery, so all 
they needed to do was add the appropriate amount of unpaid work time for 
each employee to the number of hours paid in each week. Unpaid hours 
exceeding forty in a given week, which are subject to the FLSA’s overtime 
provisions, could then be calculated by subtracting forty from the total weekly 
work hours for each employee. But not surprisingly, given its position that the 
activities did not constitute work, the company had kept no records as to the 
amount of time workers spent engaged in the unpaid activities that the jury 
determined were work.79 The Tyson plaintiffs also had not kept such records. 
The lack of records left the employees with no direct evidence as to the 
number of hours they worked in each week in the class period. This question 
could be answered, if at all, only via counterfactual evidence, whether 
testimonial or statistical in nature. The district court allowed both sorts of 
counterfactual evidence. Several employees testified as to the amount of time it 
typically took them to don, doff, and walk.80 As mentioned previously, Dr. Mericle 
described his time study and testified as to the average amount of time it took 
subject employees to do the activities in question. The plaintiffs also entered 
video recordings of donning and doffing activities and other exhibits. 
 
maintaining FLSA collective actions but also involved additional issues, so it is unclear when or 
whether the § 216(b) issue will be clarified. 
73 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
74 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (2012). 
75 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
76 Final Instructions to Jury, supra note 71, at 7. 
77 Transcript of Record, supra note 24, at 1818-19. 
78 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2012). 
79 See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1042 (2016). 
80 Bouaphakeo, 2012 WL 4471119, at *3. 
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Here it is worth considering Tyson’s argument, described above, that Dr. 
Mericle’s evidence involved different workers taking different amounts of time 
to do different work. Imagine that a single individual action had been brought by 
Plaintiff X. It is of course possible Plaintiff X actually took different amounts of 
time to do the same activity on different days. But to my knowledge, neither 
party in Tyson questioned the idea that a jury could use a single number 
of minutes to compensate such a plaintiff for unpaid work time spent in a 
given activity on different days. Thus, it was undisputed that the substantive law 
did not require plaintiffs to prove the actual unpaid work time as to any 
employee. A reasonable estimate for any employee would suffice. 
Consider next whether the FLSA allows using a single number for 
multiple employees. While Tyson made much of alleged variances in the 
amounts of time it took different employees to do the allegedly very 
different activities, the company itself had previously used time studies 
to determine how many minutes to pay for donning, doffing, and walking 
activities with respect to activities not at issue in the litigation.81 The 
company surely viewed that approach as lawful under the FLSA, which 
it would not be if every employee must be paid for the actual amount of time 
that employee takes each time she does the activity in question. 
For purposes of the Tyson litigation, then, there is no serious argument 
that the FLSA requires plaintiffs to prove the individual amounts of time 
they typically take to do donning, doffing, and walking activities. In other 
words, for sufficiently similar employees, it should be enough under the FLSA for 
employee plaintiffs to provide common evidence as to the amount of time they 
reasonably could be expected to have taken to do the contested activities. 
The questions just resolved are questions of substantive labor law. 
The remaining questions are whether the employees in the Tyson class 
were in fact sufficiently similar, and whether the evidence they provided 
was adequate to measure reasonable numbers of minutes. These 
remaining questions turn on the interaction of substantive labor law, 
federal evidence law, and the character of the evidence in question. 
2. Mt. Clemens, “Just and Reasonable Inference,” and the  
Liability–Damages Distinction 
An additional point of substantive law bears mention here. To buttress 
their reliance on the time study evidence, the Tyson plaintiffs pointed to the 
seven-decades-old precedent in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.82 In Mt. 
Clemens, workers alleged that they were unlawfully not paid for walking time 
 
81 Transcript of Record, supra note 24, at 1564-1601. 
82 328 U.S. 680 (1946). 
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at the beginning and ending of their shifts.83 As in Tyson, no one had records 
of the actual time spent in the unpaid activity, and at trial the plaintiffs used 
representative evidence. Eight plaintiffs testified in front of a special master, who 
used their testimony to estimate the time spent in unpaid work activities.84 By 
the time Mt. Clemens reached the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit had held, in 
the words of the Supreme Court, that plaintiffs had failed “to show by evidence 
rather than conjecture the extent of overtime worked, it being insufficient for 
them merely to offer an estimated average of overtime worked.”85 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when an employer has failed 
to keep proper records, “an employee has carried out his burden if he proves 
that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated 
and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work 
as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”86 Pointing to this language in Mt. 
Clemens, and to the factual similarities between the two cases, Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the Tyson Court that the “decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens explains 
why . . . [the time study] was permissible in the circumstances of this case.”87 
Writing in dissent, Justice Thomas took issue with the Court’s reliance on 
Mt. Clemens to justify admissibility of the time study as to liability. As he 
wrote, “Mt. Clemens does not hold that employees can use representative 
evidence in FLSA cases to prove an otherwise uncertain element of 
liability.”88 Thomas points to language by the Mt. Clemens Court stating that 
the “just and reasonable inference” standard is not 
to be condemned by the rule that precludes the recovery of uncertain and 
speculative damages. That rule applies only to situations where the fact of 
damage is itself uncertain. But here we are assuming that the employee has 
proved that he has performed work and has not been paid in accordance with 
the statute. The damage is therefore certain. The uncertainty lies only in the 
amount of damages arising from the statutory violation by the employer.89 
If the apparent Mt. Clemens liability–damages distinction were to matter 
in Tyson, the reason would have to do with the definition of the class certified 
by the district court, which included workers without regard to whether they 
had ever been paid for working more than forty hours in a week.90 Tyson’s 
 
83 Id. at 682-84. 
84 Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v. Anderson, 149 F.2d 461, 462 (6th Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 680. 
85 Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 686. 
86 Id. at 687. 
87 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016). 
88 Id. at 1058 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
89 Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687-88. 
90 Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 870, 909 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (certifying 
class including “[a]ll current and former employees of Tyson’s Storm Lake, Iowa, processing 
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liability to some workers would depend on the amount of work time that 
would be determined to have been unlawfully unpaid. To illustrate, suppose 
Alphonso and Betty were each plaintiff class members who worked for exactly 
one week. If Alphonso had been paid for working forty hours, then the jury’s 
determination that the contested donning, doffing, and walking activities were 
work under the FLSA makes Tyson liable to Alphonso regardless of the 
number of minutes of unpaid work time attributable to him. If Betty had been 
paid for working only thirty-nine hours in the same week, then Tyson would be 
liable to her under the FLSA’s overtime provisions only if at least sixty minutes of 
unpaid work time are attributable to Betty. Thus the time study evidence 
potentially does double duty as to Betty’s claim: (1) it determines whether Tyson is 
liable to her; and (2) it measures the damages owed her in the event of liability. 
According to Justice Thomas’s argument, there is a rule cited in Mt. Clemens 
that precludes recovery for Betty, since “Tyson’s liability to . . . [Betty would 
be] uncertain.”91 Justice Thomas characterized the majority’s use of Mt. Clemens as 
“creat[ing] a special, relaxed rule authorizing plaintiffs to use otherwise inadequate 
representative evidence in FLSA-based cases by misreading” Mt. Clemens.92 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Tyson Court did not engage the 
liability–damages distinction at all. Instead, Justice Kennedy wrote at a level 
of generality that erases that distinction by pointing out that, just as in Mt. 
Clemens, the Tyson plaintiffs “sought to introduce a representative sample to 
fill an evidentiary gap created by the employer’s failure to keep adequate 
records.”93 In a concurrence noting that he joined the Court in full, Chief 
Justice Roberts did engage Justice Thomas: 
I agree with Justice Thomas that our decision in [Mt. Clemens] . . . does not 
provide a “special, relaxed rule authorizing plaintiffs to use otherwise 
inadequate representative evidence in FLSA-based cases.” But I do not read 
the Court’s opinion to be inconsistent with that conclusion. Rather, I take the 
Court to conclude that Dr. Mericle’s study constituted sufficient proof from 
which the jury could find “the amount and extent of [each individual 
respondent’s] work as a matter of just and reasonable inference”—the same 
standard of proof that would apply in any case.94 
There are thus three visions of the majority’s basis for admitting the 
time-study evidence. First, Justice Thomas says the majority created a special rule 
that relaxes the type of evidence required under the FLSA. Second, Justice 
 
facility who have been employed at any time from February 7, 2004, to the present, and who are 
or were paid under a ‘gang time’ compensation system in the Kill, Cut, or Retrim departments”). 
91 Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1058 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 1056. 
93 Id. at 1047. 
94 Id. at 1050-51 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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Kennedy points to Mt. Clemens as an earlier FLSA instance in which the Supreme 
Court had found representative—and counterfactual—evidence sufficient 
provided that it met a general “just and reasonable inference” standard when actual 
records did not exist. And third, Chief Justice Roberts explains that “just and 
reasonable inference” is the standard “in any case,” regardless of whether the FLSA 
is involved, though the Chief Justice cites no authority for this proposition. 
The language in Mt. Clemens appearing to require more exacting 
evidence to prove liability is actually dictum. The plaintiffs in that case 
had all claimed to have worked at least forty hours per week, so the 
number of minutes spent in unlawfully unpaid work time could not 
affect liability in that case.95 Thus the question of whether representative 
evidence could establish liability was not posed in Mt. Clemens. 
Further, Supreme Court precedent actually casts doubt on Justice 
Thomas’s reading of Mt. Clemens as to the liability–damages distinction. 
Because Mt. Clemens does not cite any authority for the “rule” in question, 
I conducted a Westlaw search for the string “recovery of ” /1 (uncertain or 
speculative) /3 “damages” and then restricted attention to cases decided on 
or before the day Mt. Clemens was decided (June 10, 1946). 
In the case decided most closely to Mt. Clemens, the 1946 antitrust case 
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., a dissenting Justice Frankfurter made the 
same liability–damages distinction found in the Mt. Clemens dicta.96 The dispute 
between Justice Frankfurter and the Bigelow majority revolved around whether 
petitioners in particular had been injured by the behavior of respondents. The 
majority held that, since the jury had found respondents’ action unlawful under the 
Sherman Act, use of less-than-perfect evidence as to petitioners’ damages was 
appropriate, and it cited the “just and reasonable inference” standard to boot.97 
Bigelow’s parallels to Tyson are striking. In both cases, a jury found the 
defendant’s actions violated a federal statutory requirement—in Bigelow, the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, and in Tyson, the FLSA’s requirement that wages be paid 
for activities that constitute work. In both cases, the Supreme Court determined 
that the “wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong 
has created”98—approving the victims’ approach to proving the amount of 
damages using data on actual profits before and after the violations of antitrust 
laws to measure damages in Bigelow, and blessing the use of plaintiffs’ time-study 
 
95 Id. at 1058 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
96 327 U.S. 251, 268 (1946) (“[P]roof of the legal injury, which is the basis of his suit, is 
plaintiff ’s burden. He does not establish it merely by proving that there was a wrong to the 
public nor by showing that if he had been injured ascertainment of the exact amount of damages 
would have had an inevitable speculative element to be left for a jury’s conscientious guess.”). 
97 See id. at 264-66 (“The evidence here was ample to support a just and reasonable inference 
that petitioners were damaged by respondents’ action, whose unlawfulness the jury has found . . . .”). 
98 Id. at 265. 
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evidence to measure the number of minutes of unpaid work time in Tyson. In 
both cases, the tool to measure damages was necessary to establish that there were 
any damages at all, i.e., that the plaintiff had established liability. 
As with Tyson, then, Bigelow would have come out the other way if Justice 
Thomas’s reading of the “rule” in Mt. Clemens were correct. The most reasonable 
conclusion is that the Court had already rejected any formal distinction of the 
type Justice Thomas suggested.99 This reading is reinforced by the fact, which 
co-amici and I pointed out, that the lower courts have, for decades, regularly 
allowed employees to prove liability under the relevant sections of the FLSA.100 
If neither the bound-by–Mt. Clemens view of Tyson nor Justice Thomas’s 
view that the majority expanded Mt. Clemens is convincing, then Chief 
Justice Roberts’s cryptic statement suggests a third way to make sense of the 
Tyson Court’s use of the “just and reasonable inference” standard. This 
standard is simply a broad equitable solution to the problem that arises when 
direct evidence is impossible to find, so that only counterfactual evidence 
could be used. If counterfactual evidence can fairly be used to provide 
reasonable inferences, then there is every reason for courts to allow that 
evidence to establish whatever element is in question. The case for a 
“principle in favor of counterfactual evidence” is especially keen when direct 
evidence would be available but for the unclean hands of a party to a lawsuit. 
Of course, the principle in favor of counterfactual evidence does not, by 
itself, make any particular chunk of counterfactual evidence admissible; that 
question must be answered via the usual consideration of federal evidence 
law. The principle in favor of counterfactual evidence states only that when 
direct evidence cannot be had, courts should interpret the Federal Rules of 
Evidence liberally enough so that elements of the substantive law may be 
met in litigation with otherwise appropriate counterfactual evidence. 
Finally, inasmuch as this principle is properly viewed as an aspect of 
whatever substantive law sets liability policy in a given controversy, the 
principle should apply regardless of whether the litigation proceeds via 
individual or class actions. This point has important implications for class 
certification battles involving representative evidence targeted at 
counterfactual questions. The proper inquiry in such cases is not whether 
direct evidence, were it to exist for each plaintiff, would exhibit any differences 
across plaintiffs. Rather, it is whether such differences could be expected to 
be so great as to render common counterfactual evidence inappropriate. 
 
99 Justice Thomas’s view on this issue echoed arguments strenuously made by Tyson 
itself. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 41, at 40-44. 
100 See Professors’ Brief, supra note 2, at 15-18. 
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The late Richard Nagareda influentially argued that in Rule 23(b)(3) cases 
the certification inquiry must police for “fatal dissimilarities.”101 The 
argument above suggests that for some counterfactual questions, at least as 
much emphasis should be placed on the word “fatal” as on the mere fact of 
dissimilarity. Of course, what constitutes a great enough dissimilarity to be 
fatal is the central question. That question is not one that either Tyson or the 
Tyson dissenters engaged seriously: neither provided any basis for 
determining whether variations of the magnitude involved in Tyson are 
enough to be fatal. And having never objected, at any point in the 
litigation, to admission of any of the representative evidence, Tyson had 
no serious basis to attack the evidence itself at the Supreme Court. 
3. Summary as to Substantive Law 
In sum, this section shows the importance of the elements of substantive law 
in Tyson. It also shows that Tyson’s blessing of the time-study evidence plaintiffs 
presented should be read as an endorsement by the Court of what I have called 
“the principle in favor of counterfactual evidence.” It will be left to the lower courts 
to determine how much variation is too much—how much is “fatal”, in Professor 
Nagareda’s terms—in future cases. That determination may be susceptible to the 
formulation of general standards, but it is also likely to be one that is fact-bound 
and highly contextual, and thus one for which the district court properly 
should have “broad discretion” in future class certification decisions.102 
B. Evidence Law Matters, Too 
The issues in Tyson involved time spent in donning, doffing, and walking 
activities. Since time runs forward only, one cannot later measure the time 
any employee actually spent in these activities during the class period. One 
could ask each employee to testify directly as to this time, but since the 
record showed that employees did various jobs, with varying donning and 
doffing activities, such testimony would not obviously be more reliable for 
each employee than would representative evidence—whether testimonial or 
statistical in nature. Further, because the question at which such evidence 
is targeted is unanswerable with direct evidence, all these types of evidence 
are counterfactual evidence anyway. The threshold question for admitting 
 
101 See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 97, 107 (2009). 
102 See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
1897 (2014) for a discussion of the tension between the case for allowing district courts “broad 
discretion” in class certification and the requirement that the district court conduct a “rigorous 
analysis” before certifying. On the case for discretion, see generally Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 
(1979). On the requirement of rigor, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011). 
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such evidence is therefore not about whether the evidence is statistical or 
representative more broadly, or even about whether direct evidence, if it 
existed, would exhibit any differences across plaintiffs. Rather, the 
threshold question that evidence law poses for any such evidence is whether 
it is relevant. If evidence is relevant under Rule 401, then under Rule 402 it 
is presumptively admissible.103 When the evidence in question involves 
expert testimony, then Rule 702 and Daubert also come into play. 
1. Federal Evidence Law as Applied to the Time-Study Evidence in Tyson 
Under Rule 401, evidence concerning a consequential fact is relevant if it 
has a “tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”104 Representative evidence about donning and doffing time, whether 
testimonial or statistical, makes conclusions about a particular worker’s 
donning and doffing time more probable if and only if those who testify or 
form the sample used to create statistical evidence are similar enough in relevant 
ways to reliably measure the time for the worker in question. Whether this 
similarity holds is the critical question for any representative evidence. The basic 
framework for considering this question is given by Rule 702 in tandem with the 
considerations discussed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.105 Despite 
the “liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Daubert Court stated 
that the Rules require trial courts to make certain that scientific testimony or 
evidence that has been challenged is “not only relevant, but reliable.”106 
If evidence law provides the skeletal framework of this inquiry, the rest of 
the inquiry’s body is animated by substantive law. The time-study and other 
representative evidence in Tyson is relevant only if it tends to make facts about 
Tyson’s liability and damages owed to its workers more or less probable. The 
elements that must be established concerning liability and damages owed 
are not matters of evidence law, but rather of underlying labor law. Thus, 
while evidence law sets the basic contours of the inquiry as to admissibility, 
it is a kind of shell onto which substantive law is embedded. 
Critically, the admissibility of the evidence in question turned on a 
counterfactual question: were the plaintiffs in the case sufficiently similar such that 
the statistical average of the time it took members of a sample of Tyson’s workers 
would reasonably represent the time it actually took each worker in the class to do 
those activities? What makes this question counterfactual is that its answer 
 
103 But cf. supra note 65 and accompanying text (concerning the authority of the 
Supreme Court to limit admissibility via any rules prescribed pursuant to the REA process). 
104 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
105 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
106 Id. at 588-89. 
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depends on facts that cannot be determined with direct evidence, given that 
no records were kept of the actual time spent in the relevant activities. 
In principle, one could record all workers donning, doffing, and walking, 
and then use statistical measures such as the population standard deviation as 
a measure of how different the times were. But this approach would have two 
practical flaws. First, if one did record everyone’s time, there would be no 
reason to use a common sample in the first place; one might as well just use 
each individual’s recorded time. Second, and more problematic, the time it takes 
person X to don, doff, and walk for purposes of our exercise need not equal the 
time it took X to do so on days covered by the certified class. We would still 
need to answer the counterfactual question of whether the times recorded ex 
post for X are similar enough to the legally relevant times for which no 
records exist. X might have been more tired on the dates at issue in litigation, 
the hallways might have been less crowded, and so on.107 Thus, there is no way 
around the problem that what needs to be answered in Tyson is a counterfactual 
question. The statistical nature of the evidence at issue isn’t the source of this 
counterfactual challenge. Only counterfactual evidence was possible in Tyson. 
Evidence law comes into play again when determining whether proffered 
evidence is appropriate when its relevance depends on such counterfactual 
questions. In evidence law parlance, it is a “preliminary question” whether 
class members are similar enough for common evidence to be appropriate to 
answer a counterfactual question of the sort posed in Tyson. Rule 104 explains 
in pertinent part that a district court “must decide any preliminary question 
about whether . . . evidence is admissible,” and that “[i]n so deciding, the court 
is not bound by evidence rules[.]”108 Class certification is not trial, of 
course, but the “rigorous analysis” required at class certification109 should 
take into account whether evidence would be admissible there. For 
example, if the district court in Tyson had concluded that there was no 
way for plaintiffs to provide common evidence as to the amount of 
unpaid work time, then it might well have determined that a class action 
trial would be dominated by individualized issues, forcing the conclusion 
that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement could not be satisfied.110 
 
107 This reasoning offers one reason why I disagree with a recent Harvard Law Review case 
comment that “[w]ith respect to any of the employees that appeared among the study’s 744 
videotaped observations, the tape itself would evince that particular employee’s donning and doffing 
times.” Leading Case, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 130 HARV. L. REV. 407, 412 (2016). A second 
reason is that Dr. Mericle did not pick individual employees and follow them around all day, but instead 
recorded donning and doffing times for many employees doing each of a number of activities. Thus “the 
tape itself would” not actually “evince” any “particular employee’s” total donning and doffing time. 
108 FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
109 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011). 
110 The district court might still have certified a class action as to only the issue of whether the 
donning, doffing, and walking activities at issue in the case were “work” under the FLSA. See FED. 
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Because Tyson did not object to the admission of any representative 
evidence, the district court had no occasion to consider formally whether the 
plaintiffs were sufficiently similar such that common evidence should be 
admitted. And since the court didn’t decertify the class when Tyson so moved 
just before trial,111 it is fair to believe that the court saw no problem with the 
use of the common evidence as to the number of minutes employees worked. 
2. Justice Thomas’s Argument in Dissent 
One of the arguments Justice Thomas made in dissent in Tyson is directly 
pertinent to my discussion of counterfactual evidence and evidence law. 
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that “representative evidence can be 
used to prove an individual issue on a classwide basis if each class member, in 
an individual action, could rely on that evidence to prove his individual 
claim.”112 He then pointed to a difference in testimonial evidence and 
Dr. Mericle’s time study evidence: “Mericle’s study estimated that kill 
department employees took an average 6.4 minutes to don equipment at 
their lockers before their shift—but employee Donald Brown testified that 
this activity took him around 2 minutes. Others also testified to donning 
and doffing times that diverged markedly from Mericle’s estimates.”113 
From this recounting Justice Thomas concluded that “Mericle’s study 
could not sustain a jury verdict in favor of these plaintiffs, had they brought 
individual suits.”114 His argument is founded on a failure to apprehend the 
counterfactual nature of the representative testimony. Here is the testimony 
of Donald Brown on which Justice Thomas’s “around 2 minutes” figure 
appears to be based: 
Q. Mr. Brown, would you agree that it only takes one or two seconds to put in 
your earplugs? 
A. That’s correct. 
Q. And would you agree it only takes one or two seconds to put on 
your safety glasses? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Would you agree it only takes one or two seconds to put on your hard hat? 
 
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). With a victory as to this issue, individual plaintiffs might then have proceeded 
in individual actions to recover damages, though many of their claims likely would have been 
negative-value given the usual costs of litigation. The result might have been a game of chicken 
between plaintiffs’ attorneys and Tyson—with settlement better than litigation for both sides, but 
with the threat of subsequent litigation by plaintiffs possibly viewed as non-credible by Tyson. 
111 See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-JAJ, 2011 WL 3793962 
(N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 2011). 
112 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1057 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And would you agree it only takes about fifteen seconds per boot to 
put your boots on in the morning? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think it takes maybe 60 or 90 seconds to put your whites on, 
your white pants and your shirt? 
A. That would be close. 
Q. It only takes you a few seconds, maybe three seconds to put your 
cotton gloves on each hand, would you agree? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And for your apron, would you agree it only takes you about 15 seconds 
to put that on? 
A. Yes.115 
Notice that Brown nowhere is asked whether these were the actual amounts 
of time he spent in each activity on any particular dates. The times involved 
are apparently general estimates. Brown’s testimony as to these times is 
relevant to the actual work time for which he was unpaid only if the times to 
which he testified in his testimony are typical of his own experience on days when 
he was actually unpaid for actual work done. That means the Brown testimony that 
Justice Thomas cites is itself counterfactual evidence. Therefore, in a hypothetical 
individual action Brown might still have been able to introduce Dr. Mericle’s time 
study evidence that the activities in question take 6.4 minutes.116 A jury could 
reasonably believe that the time study evidence is more accurate than the 
2-2.5 minutes implied by Brown’s testimony, or it could conclude the 
opposite. Or, it could place some amount of weight on each estimate. 
This situation is not one in which direct evidence renders counterfactual 
evidence irrelevant, like those discussed earlier in subsection II.C. Rather, it 
is one in which each of two forms of counterfactual evidence taken in isolation 
would yield a different inference. A reasonable person—and thus a reasonable 
juror—could conclude that the truth might be somewhere in between. On 
this point, it is notable that Brown testified on direct examination that the 
activities in question took him four minutes when he previously timed 
himself undertaking those activities.117 Brown’s testimony on direct and cross 
are inconsistent with each other, but no one would suggest that either bit 
of testimony “could not sustain a jury verdict,” as Justice Thomas 
suggested of the time-study evidence.118 Juries in our system are entitled to 
 
115 Transcript of Record, supra note 24, at 708-09. This part of Brown’s testimony is cross-
examination. 
116 See id. at 1113. 
117 Id. at 687. 
118 Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1057 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
2017] The Triangle of Law 1835 
draw their own inferences in the face of conflicting evidence. Thus the 
presence of Brown’s testimony would not necessarily render the time study 
non-credible even in an individual action by Brown. 
And the Tyson jury in fact found damages were less than the amount 
implied by Dr. Mericle’s time study. This finding is consistent with a 
reasonable jury’s determination that the time-study evidence warranted some 
weight, but that other evidence such as Mr. Brown’s testimony pointed away 
from placing complete credence in the time study. The grounds for second 
guessing such a jury determination are extremely narrow in our system.119 
In sum, with a proper understanding of the counterfactual character of 
the time-study evidence in Tyson, we can see why Justice Thomas’s position 
is wrong. The time-study evidence might have been properly admitted in 
hypothetical individual actions, even if plaintiffs in those actions testified to 
unpaid work time that differed from the time study averages. Whether the 
time-study evidence should be admitted would be committed to the discretion 
of the judge in each individual action, and the weight it should get at trial would 
be a question for the jury. There is therefore nothing untoward in having a 
single judge and single jury make these determinations in a single class action. 
3. The Critical Implications of Tyson’s Failure to  
Challenge the Statistical Evidence 
An unavoidable aspect of the role of evidence in Tyson is that 
litigation choices matter.120 
Tyson’s briefing at the Supreme Court spilled a lot of ink attacking the 
quality of Dr. Mericle’s time study and Dr. Fox’s use of it to estimate unpaid 
overtime. This was curious because Tyson chose in two key ways not to 
challenge this expert evidence. First, while Tyson savaged Dr. Mericle on the 
witness stand, it allowed his evidence into the record by failing to file a 
Daubert motion challenging it. Second, even though Tyson challenged the 
legal sufficiency of the evidence via Rule 50(a) and (b) motions for 
judgment as a matter of law, including at the Court of Appeals level, it did 
not include this argument in its petition for certiorari at the Supreme Court. 
These decisions had three interlocking and critical implications. First, 
once Tyson failed to mount a Daubert challenge or otherwise challenge the 
 
119 As Justice Thomas himself recently noted, in our system damages are “a matter so peculiarly 
within the province of the jury that the Court should not alter it.” Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 
557 U.S. 404, 409 (2009) (quoting Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 
(1998)); accord Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (2016) (“Reasonable minds may differ as to whether 
the average time Mericle calculated is probative as to the time actually worked by each 
employee. Resolving that question, however, is the near-exclusive province of the jury.”). 
120 For a more detailed discussion of this broad theme, see generally Trask, supra note 3. 
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relevance of the Mericle–Fox evidence, it lost the ability to argue that that 
evidence was irrelevant. Inasmuch as the relevance of that evidence is 
necessarily lashed to the proposition that class dissimilarities are not too 
great, Tyson’s failure to object placed it in a fundamentally weak position to 
argue against the use of that evidence. Justice Kennedy raised Tyson’s failure 
to make a Daubert motion at the very outset of oral argument in the case, and 
he also trained attention on this failure in his opinion for the Court.121 
The second implication was that, by abandoning its Rule 50 arguments at the 
Supreme Court, Tyson forfeited any argument concerning the legal sufficiency 
of the plaintiffs’ evidence. Thus, by the time the Supreme Court granted cert, the 
posture of the case was such that the plaintiffs’ evidence was not only relevant 
but also collectively legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s trial verdict.122 
The third implication is one the Supreme Court only winked at, no doubt 
because its significance extends beyond even the expansive boundaries of the 
case as Tyson presented it. The jury was instructed that “[i]n order for 
non-testifying members of the class to recover, the evidence must establish 
that they suffered the same harm as a result of the same unlawful decision or 
policy,” that “the weight to be accorded the evidence is a function not of its 
quantity, but of its quality—whether the testimony covers similarly situated 
workers, and is generally consistent,” and that “[t]he representative evidence, 
as a whole, must demonstrate that the class is entitled to recover.”123 By 
finding for the plaintiffs, the jury must be understood to have determined 
that all class members suffered the same harm, that the plaintiffs’ evidence 
covered similarly situated workers and is generally consistent, and that the 
evidence demonstrates entitlement of the class to recover. 
The Seventh Amendment certainly applied to the Tyson case, since the 
FLSA provisions at issue have been held to involve a legal remedy, and under 
Curtis v. Loether the Seventh Amendment applies to suits enforcing statutory 
rights “if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action 
for damages in the ordinary courts of law.”124 Thus Tyson Foods involved a “[s]uit[] 
at common law,” and so those “fact[s] tried by a jury” in the case could not be 
 
121 See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048-49; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 4. 
122 On this score, Justice Thomas’s statement that the time-study evidence could not “sustain a jury 
verdict” due to supposedly conflicting testimony at trial is odd. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1057 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). Since the Rule 50 question of evidentiary sufficiency was off the table at the Supreme Court, 
Justice Thomas should have instead been arguing that the district court should have realized at the time of 
class certification (or of the motion to decertify) that any inconsistency of the time-study evidence and 
plaintiffs’ deposition testimony would have prevented a prospective jury from using the time-study evidence 
to measure the number of minutes of unpaid work time. This argument itself would not carry the day, for 
the same reasons I gave in subsection III.B.2, supra. But it would at least have had the virtue of aligning 
with the evidentiary and procedural posture of the case by the time it reached the Supreme Court. 
123 Final Instructions to the Jury, supra note 71, at 5-6. 
124 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). 
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“otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,” including the Supreme 
Court, other “than according to the rules of the common law.”125 
For the Supreme Court to find that the plaintiffs’ evidence was 
inappropriate to support class certification, it would have to come to different 
conclusions from those drawn by the jury on issues necessary to the verdict. 
Had the Court taken Tyson’s side, then, it would have faced a substantial 
constitutional issue: if a court decertifies a class on grounds that are flatly 
inconsistent with a jury verdict, does that constitute an unconstitutional 
reexamination of facts tried by the jury under the Seventh Amendment?126 
The Court did not answer this question—or even engage it directly. But 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Tyson majority reflects an appreciation of 
the appropriate degree of deference due the jury in the Tyson litigation: 
Once a district court finds evidence to be admissible, its persuasiveness is, in 
general, a matter for the jury. Reasonable minds may differ as to whether the 
average time Mericle calculated is probative as to the time actually worked 
by each employee. Resolving that question, however, is the near-exclusive 
province of the jury. The District Court could have denied class certification 
on this ground only if it concluded that no reasonable juror could have 
believed that the employees spent roughly equal time donning and doffing. 
The District Court made no such finding, and the record here provides no 
basis for this Court to second-guess that conclusion.127 
Here we see the tight link the Tyson majority saw between the lawfulness 
of class certification, the admissibility of the representative evidence, 
and the deference the Court accorded a jury that had weighed that 
evidence. Whether the Court saw a Seventh Amendment issue or not, 
Tyson’s failure to challenge the expert evidence’s admissibility and its 
decision to drop its challenge to the legal sufficiency of the jury’s verdict 
planted a thicket into which the Court had no interest in venturing. 
IV. THE TRIANGLE OF LAW, THE ROLE OF EVIDENCE, 
AND PRACTICAL LITIGATION CHOICES 
Read in its full context and at an appropriate level of generality, 
Tyson stands for the proposition that class certification decisions depend 
 
125 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
126 The Second Circuit has suggested as much. See Mazzei v. Money Store, 829 F.3d 260, 269 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (holding “that when a district court considers decertification (or modification) of a class after 
a jury verdict, the district court must defer to any factual findings the jury necessarily made unless those 
findings were ‘seriously erroneous,’ a ‘miscarriage of justice,’ or ‘egregious,’” because that “is the standard 
that a district court applies to a Rule 59 motion for a new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds”). 
127 Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (citation omitted). 
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on what I shall call a “Triangle of Law.” The vertices of this Triangle 
are: (1) class action law in the form of Rule 23 and associated federal 
common law; (2) the substantive law that embodies liability and related 
policies in any given case; and (3) federal evidence law in the form of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and associated federal common law. 
Figure 1 illustrates the connections between these three sources of law, as 
well as how the evidence in litigation itself is related to each of the three. 
One cannot sensibly determine whether to certify a class unless one also 
knows what the elements of substantive law require, since these elements 
define the contours of—at least—the relevant commonality and 
predominance considerations.128 Nor can one generally determine the 
facts that are of consequence, the kind of evidence that would tend to 
drive conclusions about these facts, or the type of evidence that would 
be admissible, without knowing the substantive law. Finally, the roles of 
Rule 23 and the Federal Rules of Evidence are connected because the plaintiff, 
as the party typically moving for class certification, carries the burden to 
prove with evidence that the Rule 23(a) and (b) prerequisites are satisfied. 
I have placed the actual evidence available in the litigation in the middle 
of the Triangle of Law, because its role in any class litigation is functionally 
connected to all three sources of law. Evidence must address common 
questions of fact, or, at least in Rule 23(b)(3) cases, it must not be the case 
that individual fact questions will dominate common ones. Evidence must be 
admissible. And evidence must establish the elements of the substantive law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 Surely adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a) is also bound up with substantive 
law considerations, as, for example, when class actions might implicate other claims of absent 
class members that fall within the scope of the transactions or occurrences that are the 
subjects of a proposed class action. For a wide-ranging discussion of such concerns, see generally 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005). 
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Figure 1: The Triangle of Law and the Character of Evidence 
 
 
I claim no novelty in raising these points individually. Each, operating in 
isolation, was surely understood before the instant Article’s conception. The 
contribution of my analysis is its focus on the way the three sources of 
law work together, and the relationship to each of them borne by the 
actual evidence in class action litigation.129 The Supreme Court decided 
 
129 Of course, evidence will sometimes be irrelevant for purposes of class certification. Consider 
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013), which involved reliance and 
materiality in securities litigation. The parties agreed the market for defendant Amgen’s stock was efficient 
and therefore that Basic Inc. v. Levinson’s presumption of reliance under the fraud-on-the-market theory 
would attach. See id. at 463 (citing 485 U.S. 224 (1988)). Amgen argued that plaintiffs cannot legally have 
relied on alleged fraudulent statements that are themselves not material, because efficient markets would 
not respond to immaterial statements. Thus, Amgen argued, its evidence of immateriality should have 
been considered by the district court before it certified the class. See id. at 464-65. This argument implicates 
the substantive law vertex of my Triangle. But it fails to connect adequately to the Rule 23 vertex. 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Amgen majority explained that though materiality “indisputably” 
is “an essential predicate of the fraud-on-the-market theory,” what mattered for purposes of class 
certification is “whether proof of materiality is needed to ensure that the questions of law or fact common 
to the class will ‘predominate over any questions affecting only individual members’ as the litigation 
progresses.” Id. at 467 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). She went on to explain that materiality itself 
“can be proved through evidence common to the class” and that plaintiffs’ failure to prove materiality 
would lead not to the predominance of individual questions over common ones, but rather to the court’s 
answer—common to the entire class—that the defendant is not liable. Id. at 467-68. 
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Tyson on the strength of the role played by the actual evidence, rather 
than by imposing free-floating federal common law regarding Rule 23. 
This is a salutary development in a field that has recently had its share 
of formalism detached from the practical realities of litigation.130 
Indeed, Tyson shows just how critical the on-the-ground litigation choices that 
counsel make are—and should be—to class certification determinations. Tyson 
chose to direct its attacks on time-study evidence to the jury, rather than objecting 
to its admissibility under Daubert. A Daubert objection would have triggered the 
trial court’s obligation to determine, under Rule 104(a), whether the time study 
evidence smoothed over too many differences to adequately make the connection 
between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence—with the possible consequence of leaving the plaintiffs with no way 
to meet the demands of substantive law. The Supreme Court quite properly fed 
Tyson the bitter fruit of the company’s own litigation choices. Tyson allowed the 
case to reach a jury verdict without any challenge to the admissibility of the 
evidence as to the number of minutes Tyson failed to compensate plaintiffs, and 
it also allowed the case to reach the Supreme Court in a posture that foreclosed 
any challenge to the sufficiency of that evidence. With this evidence treated as 
both relevant and sufficient, Tyson had forfeited any basis for attacking the 
quality of that evidence for purposes of class certification. 
On this front, Tyson may be a watershed moment. In Andrew Trask’s 
recent description, it 
undercuts one of the key assumptions commentators had made about the 
Roberts Court and class actions—that it is the Court, rather than the litigants, 
that determines the outcome of cases. No one doubts that the Supreme Court 
does more than just—in Chief Justice Roberts’s famous words—calling balls 
and strikes. But in an age of increasing access to court documents and 
increasing sophistication of analysis, it is foolish to try to comprehend the 
game solely by watching the umpires. If you want to know why some calls are 
balls and others strikes, you have to watch the pitcher and the batter, too.131 
In sum, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Tyson delivers a welcome dose of 
realism about the relationships between evidence, evidence law, litigation 
 
Thus Amgen shows that in similar securities cases, evidence as to materiality—unquestionably 
an important link between the substantive law and evidence law verticies—is beside the point at 
class certification because there is no link between the substantive requirement of materiality and 
the elements necessary to meet Rule 23 (unless, of course, the evidence in question addresses some 
other element that must be proved under Rule 23). 
130 Concerning the role of formalism and substantive law in recent Supreme Court class 
action jurisprudence, see Glover, supra note 3, at 1651-53, and generally Wolff, supra note 63. 
131 Trask, supra note 3, at 312 (footnote omitted). 
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choices, and class certification.132 It is notable that neither the representative 
nor the statistical nature of the evidence in Tyson played any special role in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion. To the contrary: 
A representative or statistical sample, like all evidence, is a means to 
establish or defend against liability. Its permissibility turns not on the form 
a proceeding takes—be it a class or individual action—but on the degree to 
which the evidence is reliable in proving or disproving the elements of the 
relevant cause of action. [citing FED. RULES EVID. 401, 403, and 702.] 
It follows that the Court would reach too far were it to establish general rules 
governing the use of statistical evidence, or so-called representative evidence, in 
all class-action cases. Evidence of this type is used in various substantive realms 
of the law. Whether and when statistical evidence can be used to establish 
classwide liability will depend on the purpose for which the evidence is being 
introduced and on the elements of the underlying cause of action.133 
This was the right approach to the evidence in Tyson, and it is the right 
approach moving forward. We can hope that Tyson will turn into a trend, and 
that the Court will handle practical questions practically in future class 
certification battles. Two such practical questions might have been 
addressed, but were not, in Tyson. Space constraints prevent me from 
developing these issues in depth, but they warrant a bit of discussion here. 
The first concerns the scope of jury discretion in using representative 
evidence to determine damages, and the possibility that damages might be 
paid to plaintiff class members who were actually uninjured. Justice Kennedy 
properly punted on this question in Tyson because the trial court had not yet 
entered an order as to how damages would be distributed. He noted that the 
plaintiffs argued that 
by working backwards from the damages award, and assuming each employee 
donned and doffed for an identical amount of time (an assumption that 
follows from the jury’s finding that the employees suffered equivalent harm 
under the policy), it may be possible to calculate the average donning and 
doffing time the jury necessarily must have found, and then apply this figure 
to each employee’s known gang time hours to determine which employees 
worked more than 40 hours.134 
This is a reasonable and practical idea, and it appears to be what the trial 
court has recently ordered—with the proviso of two conditions intended to 
 
132 That is not to say that Justice Kennedy belabored the point; he mentioned the 
Federal Rules of Evidence only twice. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (citing FED. R. 
EVID. 401, 403, 702); id. at 1049 (citing FED. R. EVID. 402, 702). 
133 Id. at 1046 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 
134 Id. at 1050. 
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ensure that no uninjured worker receives any damages.135 Writing in 
concurrence in Tyson, Chief Justice Roberts suggested a more muscular 
degree of jury policing. He points to the “problem” that the $2.9 million jury 
verdict was for an amount less than plaintiffs’ expert testimony suggested. 
The Chief Justice argued that “[i]f we knew that the jury had accepted the 
plaintiffs’ proposed average donning and doffing times in calculating the 
verdict, we could easily overcome this problem. But we know the jury did no 
such thing.”136 This is a problem, according to Chief Justice Roberts, because 
Dr. Mericle’s evidence involved two separate groups of employees, each 
having different numbers of minutes of uncompensated donning, doffing, and 
walking time. “And there’s the rub,” he wrote: 
We know that the jury must have found at least one of Dr. Mericle’s two 
averages to be too high. And we know, as Dr. Fox testified, that if Dr. 
Mericle’s averages were even slightly too high, hundreds of class members 
would fall short of the 40-hour workweek threshold that would entitle them 
to damages. But because we do not know how much donning and doffing time 
the jury found to have occurred in each department, we have no way of 
knowing which plaintiffs failed to cross that 40-hour threshold.137 
Chief Justice Roberts went on to argue, similar to an argument Tyson had 
made in its cert petition and then largely abandoned in merits briefing, that 
this issue implicates Article III standing concerns.138 But if there is a problem 
here, it is not one that implicates any interest of Tyson’s. Nowhere does Chief 
Justice Roberts suggest that the jury’s verdict should be treated as awarding 
damages to uninjured plaintiffs. And even if it were possible that the jury did 
so, deference to jury fact determinations requires drawing any reasonable 
inference in favor of a verdict’s lawfulness. Chief Justice Roberts’s own 
examples show that a lawful verdict is possible here. There is no legitimate reason 
to go rooting around for a speculative Article III problem with the Tyson verdict. 
But there is a potentially real issue with the distribution of the damage 
award in Tyson that implicates a common Rule 23 concern involving adequacy 
of representation. On remand, the district court eliminated from 
consideration for damages any employee who was not paid by Tyson for at 
least forty hours in a week, as well as those workers with calculated damages 
less than $50. In so doing, the court favored some class members over others. 
Because the damage award is fixed, those who will be paid damages benefit at 
 
135 See generally Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-JAJ, 2016 WL 
5868081 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 6, 2016). As of May 8, 2017, no notice of appeal has appeared in 
the case docket that would indicate Tyson is appealing this order. 
136 Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1051 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
137 Id. at 1052 (citation omitted). 
138 Id. at 1053; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 25-30. 
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the expense of those who will not. But it is difficult to see what injury is 
caused Tyson, which must pay the same amount of money however it is 
distributed. Ironically, it is Tyson, not any uninjured employees, that seems 
to lack the kind of interest required for Article III standing.139 But employees 
who do not receive damages might have a legitimate beef with the district 
court’s order, whether under Rule 23(a) or the Due Process Clause. 
Should any plaintiffs object, the trial court—and possibly the Supreme 
Court—will have to weigh the interests of uncompensated slightly injured 
workers against the interests of those who were more substantially injured. 
My hope is that the law on this issue develops in a way that appropriately 
takes into account the competing interests of the different plaintiffs. 
That is a nice jumping-off point for the second future practical question 
left unaddressed in Tyson: how should due process concerns be weighed? This 
issue came up in Tyson thanks to Tyson’s citation of the by-now infamous 
“Trial by Formula” language in Dukes.140 Tyson claimed that determining its 
liability and damages based on statistical averages from time study evidence 
violated its right to raise individualized defenses because “[i]t is not feasible to call 
hundreds or thousands of class members at trial[.]”141 The Supreme Court did not 
take up Tyson’s due process arguments; the phrase “due process” appears nowhere 
in any of the case’s three opinions. That is not surprising, given the number 
of ways in which Tyson shot itself in the foot with its own litigation choices. 
But due process concerns arise frequently in class action disputes, and it is 
time for the Court to provide clearer and better guidance about the framework 
in which due process should be evaluated. The Court would do well to adopt 
the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing framework in the class action theater.142 As 
co-amici and I pointed out, the Supreme Court has a decades-long tradition of 
using Mathews to evaluate even the most fundamental due process interests.143 
Tyson had access to many procedural protections before, during, and after trial. 
It chose to forego some of them. Those it did use included the opportunity to 
attack via cross examination both the statistical evidence and the representative 
testimony that the plaintiff class offered. These challenges vindicated Tyson’s 
interest in raising individual defenses, even if Tyson did not thereby raise each 
defense as to each individual issue raised by each individual plaintiff ’s claim. 
 
139 Compare with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985) (noting a party has 
a “distinct and personal interest” as to absent class members’ rights due to the party’s interest 
“in seeing the entire plaintiff class bound by res judicata just as [the party] is bound”). 
140 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011). 
141 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 41, at 37. 
142 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (holding that “identification of the specific dictates of due 
process” is based on three factors: (1) the “private interest that will be effected by the government 
action”; (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest”; and (3) “the Government’s 
interest, including” its interest in limiting its “fiscal and administrative burdens”). 
143 See Professors’ Brief, supra note 2, at 19-21 (citing 424 U.S. at 332-34). 
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On any reasonable weighing of the three Mathews factors, class litigation in 
Tyson would meet the Court’s test. Tyson’s due process interest in avoiding 
aggregate litigation with the included statistical evidence was small, since applicable 
substantive law, evidence law, and Tyson’s own litigation choices together would 
have made the statistical evidence in question admissible in individual actions. 
The risk of error from aggregate litigation was small in light of Tyson’s 
ability to raise its defenses by cross-examining not only the plaintiffs’ two 
expert witnesses, which it did with gusto, but also numerous testimonial 
representatives.144 Tyson also might have called its own time-study expert to 
further undermine the plaintiff ’s time-study evidence, but it chose not to. The 
actual litigation process gave Tyson numerous ways to vindicate its interests. 
And the burden of requiring individual litigation would have been severe 
for the judicial system, the plaintiffs, or both.145 According to the Tyson 
plaintiffs, no plaintiff was entitled to as much as ten thousand dollars of 
damages.146 Suppose an initial plaintiff or group of them joined under Rule 
20 were to have obtained a liability judgment against Tyson. Even armed 
with the issue-preclusive value of such a judgment, subsequent plaintiffs 
likely would not have found it worth their while to sue for such slight 
damages. And if they did, the burden on these plaintiffs of disallowing 
aggregate litigation with the statistical evidence would have been thousands 
of time-consuming individual actions clogging a single United States district 
court, in which substantially similar evidence would be offered seriatim. 
Arguably, then, disallowing aggregate litigation in this case would indeed 
have imposed a severe burden on the judicial system, plaintiffs, or both. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and judges’ own decisions limit and 
shape parties’ abilities to litigate as they might like. Unless these Rules and 
decisions facially violate due process—a preposterous suggestion—then it is 
within the bounds of due process to trade off litigants’ interests against the 
exigencies posed by the need to provide a “just, speedy, and inexpensive 
 
144 Moreover, an important provision of the FLSA, and decades of practice, have made clear 
that representative litigation is appropriate under § 216 of the FLSA. With due regard to 
the frailties of the substance–procedure dichotomy, § 216 is more than just a form of 
joinder—it is a congressionally offered invitation to representative litigation. Inasmuch as 
the FLSA and the IWPCL (derivatively) allow plaintiffs to use representative evidence, one 
might argue that there isn’t even any risk of error related to aggregate litigation with that 
evidence. I will not press that argument here; I mean only to point out that it exists. 
145 On this point, see Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991), which extends the Mathews 
test to situations in which the third prong requires “principal attention to the interest of ” a 
private party, “with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have 
in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater protections[.]” 
146 Appellant’s Appendix at 904-72, Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th 
Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3753). 
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determination” of civil actions and proceedings.147 The use of the class action 
device to litigate cases with similarly situated class members using appropriately 
representative common evidence fits within the balancing framework established 
by Mathews. Rather than viewing due process interests as Dworkinian trumps,148 
the Supreme Court should begin taking advantage of the pragmatic and 
functional Mathews approach in sorting through due process arguments at class 
certification—whether these arguments are made by defendants or on behalf of 
those claiming that critical conflicts exist within a class definition.149 
CONCLUSION 
Tyson raised numerous big-ticket questions concerning the contours of 
class actions. Had the case come out the other way, there might have been 
substantial damage, or at least confusion, concerning the admissibility of 
statistical and other forms of representative evidence, as well as major new limits 
on Rule 23(b)(3) class actions involving any differences in plaintiff class members. 
But after taking cert on a potential hurricane of a case, the Supreme Court 
conjured instead a gentle breeze, emphasizing the role of prosaic litigation 
choices and bread-and-butter evidence law principles. Even the Court’s 
apparent addition of new bite to the Rules Enabling Act came sotto voce. 
Still, Tyson may be a big case. It may herald a more pragmatic approach 
in Supreme Court assessments of class certification. It opens up space for 
trial courts to do what they are supposed to do in class actions: exercise 
discretion on fact-bound questions tied to the specific contexts of the 
complex litigation in front of them. And that is a good thing. 
 
147 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
148 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977) (arguing rights 
protect individual interests by excluding appeals to the common good as a justification for limiting rights). 
149 One implication of adopting the Mathews framework is that some approaches to class 
litigation will violate due process because the impingement on the defendant’s interests is especially 
great by comparison to the comparative burdens on plaintiffs and the judiciary of alternative 
litigation models. A plausible example is the Dukes trial court’s use of what Professor Robert Bone 
has called statistical adjudication—adjudicating cases “based not on the facts of the specific case, but 
on statistical extrapolations from outcomes in a sample of other cases.” Robert G. Bone, Tyson Foods 
and the Future of Statistical Adjudication, 95 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2). In 
Dukes, the defendant might not have been able to raise some defenses at all; in light of the Supreme 
Court’s determination that Title VII required case-by-case determinations of unlawful employment 
practices, this feature of the trial plan would raise serious problems under the Mathews framework. 
By contrast, Tyson was able to raise all the defenses in the class trial—it just had to do so in a 
representative way. When successful, this might benefit Tyson writ large against the class as a whole. 
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